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THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES UNDER
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972)
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against further construction of two
federal buildings, one a jail, the other a conventional office building, on
the basis that the defendant, Administrator of the General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA), had failed to prepare an environmental impact
statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).' GSA contended that no statement was required because it
had concluded that the buildings would have no significant adverse
effect on the environment.2 The trial court3 held defendant had cor-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPAL.
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) [hereinafter referred to as section
102(2) (C) ], provides in part:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented ....
2. The basis for GSA's contention was elaborated in the following internal memo-
randum prepared by the Regional Director of the Public Building Services of GSA:
The impact of the proposed action will have no adverse effects on the environ-
ment, including ecological systems, population distribution, transportation,
water or air pollution, nor will it be any threat to health or life systems or
urban congestion. These points are further amplified as follows:
1. It is our intention to connect with the existing New York utility
services, including water supply, sewage disposal, solid waste disposal,
storm water drainage, etc.
2. It is planned that the heating will be by purchase steam from Con
Edison Company of New York ....
3. Trash removal will be by commercial contract.
4. There will be no relocation of people involved ..
5. There will be no material impact at all on public transportation.
6. Number of people to be housed in the Bureau of Prisons operation
is given as 405.
7. Zoning-C6-1.
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plied with the Act and denied relief. On appeal the court of appeals
affirmed as to the office building, but reversed 4 as to the jail. Held:
a federal agency that undertakes a major federal action can avoid pre-
paring an environmental impact statement only if it can demonstrate
that it has adequately considered all possible environmental impact from
the action.
Prior to the passage of NEPA,5 there was no comprehensive federal
8. We intend to follow the existing zoning regulations.
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1972).
3. Hanly v. Mitchell (S.D.N.Y., March 17, 1972) (unpublished memorandum).
4. However, the court "suggest[ed] that the injunctive order be stayed for a short
period of time, but no more than 30 days, to allow the necessary threshold determina-
tion of the jail's environmental impact to be made while the preliminary work on the
construction site continue[dl." Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d at 649. Other courts
have stayed injunctions in the same way, on the grounds that the balance of hardships
would render a suspension of work in progress inequitable. E.g., City of New York v.
United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Goose Hollow Foothills League v.
Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971); see Note, Retroactive Application of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 69 MICH. L. Rev. 732 (1971). But see
Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
5. NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970, when it was signed by President
Nixon. An earlier bill, S. 2805, introduced in 1967, had resulted in a congressional
colloquium in July, 1968, to discuss a national policy on the environment. For contri-
butions to the colloquium, see Hearings on a National Policy for the Environment Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs and the House Comm. on Science
& Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The colloquium's findings are contained in
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS AND HousE CoMM. ON SCIENCE & As-
TRONAuTICS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1968). On February 18, 1969, S. 1075 was introduced by Sen.
Jackson (Wash.). The bill created a Council on Environmental Quality, and authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to conduct environmental studies. After hearings on S. 1075
were held in April, 1969, the bill was amended to include procedural requirements
under § 102. See Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm.
on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, 112-16, 205-07 (1969). This
form of S. 1075 required a "finding" by the responsible official on "proposals for
legislation or other significant Federal actions affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment . . . ." Id. at 207 (emphasis added). Section 102 was further amended fol-
lowing suggestions of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to read: "proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting . . . ." (Emphasis
added.) See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27-34 (1969). This version of the
bill was passed by the Senate on July 10, 1969. H.R. 12549, an extensively amended
version of S. 1075 which deleted all procedural requirements, was sponsored by Rep.
Dingell (Mich.) and passed by the House on September 23, 1969. A compromise bill,
reported by a conference committee on December 17, 1969, replaced the word "findings"
with "detailed statement," and otherwise essentially reinstituted the Senate bill's pro-
cedural directions. See H.R. REp. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1969). The
compromise bill (enacted as Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852) was passed by the
Senate on December 20, 1969, and by the House on December 23, 1969. See generally
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legislation directing national priorities with respect to environmental
problems." Particular problems, such as allocation of resources, pollu-
tion, and urban congestion, were dealt with independently by the agen-
cies having jurisdiction, often without guidance or accountability."
NEPA was designed to supplant this practice of isolated decision-mak-
ing by coordinating agency activities that affect the quality of the en-
vironment.' The Act attempted to accomplish this by: (1) declaring
a national policy on the environment;9 (2) creating an administrative
S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-13 (1969); 115 CONG. REc. 40415-19 (1969)
(remarks of Sen. Jackson); 115 CONG. REC. 26572 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Dingell);
Yannacone, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIR. L. 8 (1970). For
an analysis of the overall achievement of the ninety-first session of Congress on en-
vironmental matters, see SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INsULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG.,
IST SESS., CONGRESS AND THE NATION'S ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS OF
THE 91ST CONGRESS (1971).
6. See generally LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Baldwin & Page eds. 1970);
1 A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1972); FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE SUB-
COMM. ON ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, & DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON SCIENCE & ASTRONAUTICS, 90,m CONG., 2D SSS., MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
(1968); Hearings on H.R. 6750 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife
Conserv ation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 6 (1969); America's Changing Environment, 96 DAEDELUS 1003 (1967);
Feiss, Standards for Urban Development in the United States, in Hearings on the
Quality of Urban Life Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Urban Growth of the House
Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1970); Comment,
America's Changing Environment-Is the NEPA a Change for the Better? 40 FoRD.
L. REV. 897, 898-902 (1972).
7. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1969); P. WEISS, RENEWABLE
RESOURCES: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES (NAS-NRC
Publ. No. 100A) (1962); Jackson, Foreward: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and
the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1970); Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and
Natual Systems: Agency Response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
3 LoYOLA U.L.J. 19 (1972).
8. See generally Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of
United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 743, injunction granted, 325 F. Supp. 749,
injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Peterson, An Analysis of
Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIR. L. REP. 50035
(1971); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 647 (1970).
9. Declarations of purpose in the Act are found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 & 4331(a)
(1970). NEPA has been criticized as being merely a statement of policy, without
creating affirmative duties for federal agencies. See, e.g., Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C.
1082. 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Lynch & Stevens, Environmental Law-The Uncertain
Trumpet, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 10 (1970); Note, The National Environmental Policy
Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing? 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139 (1970).
Washington University Open Scholarship
238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:235
agency to coordinate and oversee agency efforts to achieve that policy;'0
and (3) establishing procedural requirements for all federal agencies to
insure consideration of environmental problems in planning."
The procedural requirements, contained in section 102 (2) (C), apply
to "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." Such actions must be preceded by a "detailed statement"
on five prescribed environmental considerations."2 The Act thus implies
that there are actions for which no detailed statement is required,'" but
fails to provide further standards by which the agency is to determine
whether it must file a statement.14  The legislative history of the Act,
however, reveals an intent that agency discretion be limited,"; and that
10. The agency created was the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The
duties and responsibilities of CEQ are outlined in Title H of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4341-47 (1970).
11. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 786-88 (D. Me. 1972);
S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1969); 115 CoNo. REc. 40416 (1969)
(remarks of Sen. Jackson); Jackson, Foreward: Environmental Quality, the Courts,
and the Congress, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1073, 1079 (1970).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d at 644; Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird,
336 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Me. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882, 888 (W.D.
Wis. 1971); Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
14. CEQ's Guidelines stated that the phrase "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" is "to be construed by agencies with
a view to the overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed (and of further ac-
tions contemplated)." Further, if "there is potential that the environment may be
significantly affected," or if the action is likely to be "highly controversial," a statement
is to be prepared. CEQ Guidelines § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971) (emphasis
added). Pursuant to a directive of the Guidelines and to Executive Order No. 11514,
35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), GSA has issued its own administrative guidelines for com-
pliance with NEPA. The document states that the determination of what is a "major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" is "in large
part a judgment based on the circumstances of the proposed action," and lists very
general criteria, including "likely to be environmentally controversial." GSA Environ-
mental Statements, Attachment B, § 1, 36 Fed. Reg. 23336 (1971).
For an outline of the initial response of other agencies to NEPA, see Hearings on
First Annual Environmental Quality Report Before the Senate Comm. on Interior &
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-24 (1970); Hearings on the Administration of
the National Environmental Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife
Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 41, pts. 1 & 2 (1970).
15. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14 (1969) (legislative
mandate to consider environmental consequences of actions); Hearings on S. 1075,
S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 80-86, 116 (1969); 115 CONG. REc. 40927 (1969) (remarks of Rep.
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a statement must be filed if there is a reasonable possibility of environ-
mental impact.",
When agencies have attempted to comply with NEPA by actually fil-
ing an impact statement, courts have not applied a uniform standard of
review. It has been held that a court may review only procedural com-
pliance with NEPA, and not the judgment of the agency.17  Impact
statements have been held inadequate because they contained only un-
supported conclusions,' 8 or because they were not sufficiently "de-
tailed."'19 Courts have found compliance with NEPA under a "good
Galifianakis) (purpose of NEPA to prevent subjective judgment by federal agencies);
115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson: "action-forcing pro-
cedures . . . of section 102 direct any Federal agency which takes action that it must
take into account environmental management and environmental quality considera-
tions"); 115 CONG. REC. 29053 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (§ 102(2)(C) de-
signed to prevent "self-policing" by federal agencies); 115 CoNG. REc. 26572 (1969)
(remarks of Rep. Dingell).
16. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. The emphasis in the legislative
materials is on the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" rather than on any limitations
on the application of the procedures to specified agency actions. Frequently the phrase
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" is omitted in the mate-
rials. See, e.g., H.R. REP'. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969); 115 CONG. REC.
40925 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
17. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440, 444 (W.D. Wis. 1972); Conserva-
tion Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972); cf. Scenic Hudson Pres.
Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1971).
18. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
The court asserted that the statement was intended not only to "aid the agency's
decision-making process," but to "advise the public of the environmental consequences
of the proposed action" as well. The statement provides evidence that the agency has
adequately considered the relevant factors. Id. at 810.
19. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United
States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, injunction granted, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
The court described NEPA as a "full disclosure law," and indicated that the environ-
mental impact statement
. I . should, at a minimum, contain such information as will alert . . . the
public . . . to all known possible environmental consequences of proposed
agency action. Where experts, or concerned public or private organizations,
or even ordinary lay citizens, bring to the attention of the responsible agency
environmental impacts which they contend will result from the proposed
agency actions, then the § 102 statement should set forth those contentions
and opinions, even if the responsible agency finds no merit in them whatsoever.
Id. at 759. Cf. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d
783, motion for summary reversal denied, 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
For cases in which the agency's impact statement was held to be sufficiently detailed,
see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972); National Forest
Pres. Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp. 696 (D. Mont. 1972); Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp.
868 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401
(D.D.C. 1971). But cf. Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining Environment v. Volpe,
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faith" standard,2 ° and non-compliance under the "rule of reason. 21
Finally, the section 102(2)(C) statement has been held to require a
"balancing" of environmental costs and benefits, with full, "individual-
ized" consideration of relevant factors.
22
When agencies have relied on their discretion not to make a state-
ment,23 on the basis that the proposed action either is not "major" or
330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (paper submitted under both NEPA and § 4(f)
of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq. (1970)).
20. Aleut League v. AEC, 337 F. Supp. 534 (D. Alaska 1971). Courts have
looked at the agency's activities in compiling an environmental record, as weil as at the
final statement itself. See, e.g., Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining Environment v.
Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
21. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). The court was concerned that, although the impacts of the proposed action
were set forth "in considerable range and detail," the report's conclusion was apparently
ignored by the agency in its planning. Id. at 830.
22. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C.
Cir. 1971):
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of federal
agencies. In each individual case, the particular economic and technical bene-
fits of planned actions must be assessed and then weighed against the environ-
mental costs; alternatives must be considered which would effect the balance
of values . . . . The magnitude of possible benefits and possible costs may lie
anywhere on a broad spectrum. Much will depend on the particular magni-
tudes involved in particular cases. In some cases, the benefits will be great
enough to justify a certain quantum of environmental costs; in other cases,
they will not be so great and the proposed action may have to be abandoned
or significantly altered so as to bring the benefits and costs into a proper
balance. The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that,
with possible alternatives, the optimally beneficial action is finally taken.
The court held the AEC regulations inadequate, among other reasons, for restricting
AEC's consideration of environmental problems at various stages of the review process.
AEC's current regulations, revised in response to this decision, were published in 10
C.F.R. 50, App. D (1971). For further discussion of the Calvert Cliffs case, see
52 B.U.L. Rav. 425 (1972); 58 VA. L. Rv. 177 (1972). See generally 1 A. RErrzn,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 102 (1972).
23. When agencies have been challenged for failure to file a statement under
§ 102(2)(C) of NEPA, the issues have been framed by the defense proffered by the
agency. These defenses can be grouped into five general categories. The first is a
reliance on discretion not to file a statement, discussed in text accompanying notes
23-27 infra.
Second, when the agency has argued that the primary responsibility for preparing the
impact statement lies with the state agency or private company which is more directly
involved in the action, courts have granted injunctions until the responsible federal
agency complies with the statute. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Goose Hollow Foothills League v.
Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971); cf. City of Boston v. Volpe, 464
F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972); Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority,
463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972); Kitchen v. FCC, 464 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Upper
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will not "significantly affect the quality of the human environment,"
most courts have reviewed the decision only to determine if it was "ar-
bitrary" or "capricious."24  Rarely have courts remanded for a more
Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971).
Third, agencies have argued that NEPA does not apply to them on four grounds.
(A) The statute authorizing their activities precludes NEPA compliance. See Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq. (1970)); National Helium Corp. v. Mor-
ton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (Helium Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 67 et seq. (1970)).
(B) The agency involved is a private corporation subsidized by the federal government.
See Miltenberger v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 450 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1971) (dictum)
(defendant railroad placed under federal control by AMTRAX legislation, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 501 et seq. (1970)). (C) The agency involved is an "environmental protection
agency." See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971) (Corps of Engineers).
(D) The needs of national security rendered public consideration of the project im-
practicable. See McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971). In these cases,
courts have generally stressed the inclusive language of §§ 101 & 102 of NEPA, and
granted immunity only in special circumstances.
Fourth, agencies have argued-usually unsuccessfully-that NEPA cannot be applied
to actions initiated before January 1, 1970. It is now settled that the Act can be ap-
plied retroactively. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1972); Environmental Law Fund v. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal.
1972); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Nolop
v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.S.D. 1971) (dictum); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971);
cf. Morris v. TVA, 345 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (continual operation of dam
project initiated prior to 1970). Contra, Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971). No clear standard has emerged, but the rule
generally seems to be that the Act will be applied except where final decisions or
substantial commitments were begun prior to 1970; see Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1972); Maddox v. Bradley, 345 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D. Tex. 1972); San
Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1972); cf. Conserva-
tion Soc'y v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Ver. 1972) (balancing test); Investment
Synd., Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970). Section 11 of the CEQ
Guidelines requires compliance "to the maximum extent practicable" to projects initiated
prior to the effective date of NEPA. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7727 (1971).
Fifth, agencies have admitted their duty to file a statement, but have argued that the
proper time for preparing it had not yet arrived. Courts, emphasizing the purpose of
NEPA to ensure consideration of environmental problems as early as possible in order
to minimize destructive effects from federal projects, have generally ruled against
agencies when they argue that the statement is not required until final approval of
the planned action. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see Port of New York Authority v. United
States, 451 F.2d 783, 789-90 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum); Lever Bros. Co. v. FTC, 325
F. Supp. 371 (D. Me. 1971); cf. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska
1971).
24. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971):
If the LEAA [Law Enforcement Assistance Administration], after following
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thorough consideration of this "threshold determination"; 25 rather,
they have decided on the facts that an action does26 or does not2 7 neces-
sitate a statement, and required the agency either to file one before
continuing with the activity, or dismissed the case, accordingly. Be-
cause each case centers largely on the peculiar facts of the proposed
action, and on the allegations of plaintiffs, no consistent standard of
review has emerged.
The court in Hanly established a minimum guideline, or "content re-
quirement," of the threshold determination by the agency by requiring
GSA to explain in detail why it decided that no impact statement was
the precepts of . . . NEPA, makes a good faith judgment as to the conse-
quences, courts have no further role to play. We note, however, that a federal
agency obligated to take into account the values that . . . NEPA seek[s]
to safeguard, may not evade that obligation by keeping its thought processes
under wraps. Discretion to decide does not include a right to act perfunctorily
or arbitrarily. That is the antithesis of discretion. The agency must not only
observe the prescribed procedural requirements and actually take account of
the factors specified, but it must also make a sufficiently detailed disclosure
so that in the event of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, the court
will not be left to guess whether the requirements of . . . NEPA have been
obeyed.
For further discussion of the Ely case, see 1972 DUK L.J 667. See also Citizens for
Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.
Supp. 856 (W.D. Wis. 1971). In Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334
F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971), the court noted CEQ's construction of the phrase "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment" (see note 14 supra) and held
that HUD had inadequately considered problems such as population distribution, traffic,
and changes in the character of the neighborhood in determining what impact the
proposal (construction of a high-rise apartment complex) would have.
25. But see Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. See, e.g., Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States,
346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972); Businessmen Affected Severely by Yearly Action
Plans, Inc. v. D.C. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972) (held that an urban
renewal project was both "major" and would "significantly affect" the environment as
a matter of law); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972). The court in Natural Resources Defense Council defined "major
federal action" as a "federal action that requires substantial planning, time, resources,
or expenditure," and said of the standard "significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment" that it "can be construed as having an important or meaningful
effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of aspects of the human environment. The
cumulative impact with other projects must be considered." Id. at 367. See also Goose
Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971); cf. Fayetteville
Area Chamber of Commerce & Interstate 95 Comm. v. Volpe, 463 F.2d 402 (4th Cir.
1972).
27. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.
1971); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Vir-
ginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Davis v. Morton, 335
F. Supp. 1258 (D.N.M. 1971) (approval of lease of Indian land not "major").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/15
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needed. This position is supported by the legislative history of the Act,
which indicates that two statements were envisioned, one to reflect the
agency's judgment on whether the action will have the requisite "effect,"
the second the full impact statement explicitly required by section 102
(2) (C). 28
The Hanly court rejected plaintiffs' argument that all "major" federal
actions necessarily have a "significant effect" on the environment, and
found that these were distinct concepts, each subject to the agency's
judgment.2" The court stated that the purpose of section 102 was to
require federal agencies to "affirmatively develop a reviewable environ-
mental record,"3 and that this record must reflect a consideration of all
relevant information. The court indicated that if GSA determined that
a statement was needed, it would then have to comply with the detailed
procedures of section 102(2) (C); if not, its decision could again be re-
viewed by the district court.3 1
In deciding that the GSA memorandum 2 was inadequate with re-
spect to the jail, 3 the court noted that even by the most conservative
standard of judicial review of agency actions, GSA acted arbitrarily in
not "tak[ing] into account all relevant factors in making its determina.
28. 115 CONG. REc. 40419-20 (1969) (Exh. 2: Section-by-section Analysis of
NEPA) (emphasis added):
(C) After consultation with and obtaining the comments of Federal and
State Agencies which have jurisdiction by law with respect to any environ-
mental impact, each agency which proposes legislation or any other major
Federal action shall make a detailed statement as to whether the proposal
would have a significant effect upon the quality of the human environment.
If the proposal is considered to have such significant effect, then the recom-
mendation or report of the proposal must include a detailed statement by
the responsible official ....
Section 6 of the CEQ Guidelines also recommends two statements-a "draft state-
ment" and a "final statement"-designed to ensure circulation of proposed alterna-
tives as early as possible. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7725 (1971).
29. 460 F.2d at 644. This position is supported by S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1969), and the materials cited in note 28 supra.
30. 460 F.2d at 647.
31. ld. at 649.
32. A second memorandum, written by the Commissioner of the Public Building
Service of GSA, dealt only with the office building. Id. at 645 n.5.
33. Id. at 646 (emphasis added):
The memorandum contains no hard look at the peculiar environmental impact
of squeezing a jail into a narrow area directly across the street from two large
apartment houses. Indeed, there is not even a word about these apartment
houses or the others located nearby. If GSA were planning a missile base on
that site, a compact discussion of sewage, garbage, water and heat would
hardly be adequate. Additional factors would have to be considered, and the
same principle holds true here.Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion."34  The court specifically pointed to the agency's failure to con-
sider noise problems and possible inmate disturbances, the potential
dangers of placing an out-patient treatment center in an urban resi-
dential area, and traffic and parking problemsY5 The court apparently
relied on the trial record and plaintiffs' specific allegations in finding
GSA's evaluation inadequate.3 6
The Hanly court places a further requirement on federal agencies
that attempt to avoid writing a section 102(2) (C) impact statement. By
forcing them to make a detailed explanation of a no-impact decision,
the thoroughness required of this "threshold determination" will depend
largely on the deficiences raised at trial by the challenging party, so that
the court will have some basis for determining whether the agency acted
arbitrarily. It is unclear, however, how closely the detail required of
a challenged threshold determination corresponds to the detail required
of a full section 102(2) (C) impact statement.
34. Id. at 648. Yet the court held that the same considerations (and conclusions)
of GSA were adequate with respect to the office building. "Thus, whatever the
theoretical environmental impact of a nine-story office building may be, in this case
the actual impact appears to be minimal and adequately accounted for in the ...
memorandum." Id. at 646.
35. Id. at 646-47.
36. See id. at 643, 647. The court acknowledges that NEPA does not offer an
"exhaustive list of so-called 'environmental considerations,'" but states that the Act's
aims "without question. . . extend beyond sewage and garbage and even beyond water
and air pollution." Id. at 647.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/15
